I argue that all words are not ultimately neutral, but many (most) are. Some can move from Neutral to Good or Bad but only by interjecting additional criteria beyond basic, fact of the Universe morality—which I argue is inherently true, not arguable though difficult to grasp.
Consider this partial list of words categorized (I argue) by ultimate, inherent moral status (not mood affiliation):
Good:
Ethical
Moral
Faithful
Rational
Capitalist
Neutral:
Black, white, man, woman, American, European, African, etc.
Atheist, Catholic, Islamist, Jew, agnostic, etc.
Carpenter, accountant, engineer, politician (at least generally), homemaker, etc.
Cynic (As I’ve argued before, yes, this one easily slips into the bad category, but on the surface it is neutral.)
Bad (aka, “boo”) words:
Racist
Evil
Communist
Socialist
My categorization reveals my values, and this serves as examples where I would argue these values are based upon essential values that cannot be argued against. There are two claims here (one strong and one weak):
The strong claim is that such a delineation can be made at all; hence, there are objective values.
The weak claim is that I have insight into it; hence, that my list might be on the right track.
The argument for #1 is based upon ethical intuitionism. The argument for #2 would be that my intuition is good. I call the first strong and the second weak because I am much more certain of the first than the second.
Arguing my claims
Someone might protest that my list reveals mere opinions, but I would argue something stronger. To understand this, consider the vast domain of Neutral words. Neutral words are where one can have an opinion that would elevate or demote a word based upon either of two criteria.
One version would be pure opinion like in the case where “red” or “green” are colors one likes or dislikes or descriptors like “Oklahoma football fan” or “Texas football fan”. Elevation or demotion here would be for pure personal aesthetic reasons. Here it is would be a list of personal preferences; hence, it would be uninteresting.1
Another version would be where one has more meaningful arguments central to the field for which the word resides. In this case “atheist” or “Catholic” are given value judgements based on priors. On the surface these are neutral words. But once we delve into religious debate, they take on deeper meaning. Each can be elevated or demoted based upon independent premises where the elevation or demotion is dependent upon something else already established. This process is a sublevel categorization that, I would argue, moves from fact of the Universe to fact of the moment (the moment meaning whatever necessary criteria is used to frame the further delineation). Therefore, it is fine to make the following claim:
(a) Given [agreed upon values and moral claims and general beliefs]
(b) Realizing that Christianity best satisfies these and Catholicism best satisfies them further.
(c) Catholicism specifically and Christianity generally are Good words, atheism is a Bad word, etc.
Obviously, this argument begs the question from the standpoint of my strong claim. It requires (a) to get to (c). But given (a) and (b), (c) does or can follow logically. To a general onlooker from the point of view of ethical intuitionism this is uninteresting pushing this example to version one—personal preference. But to those who share a lot of interest as well as common ground with (a) and (b), this is highly interesting. Where they go wrong is in failing to realize (c) depends upon (a) and (b) rather than that it can stand on its own.
It is critically important to realize that this type of claim is legitimate in terms of recategorization despite being repugnant or otherwise rightfully rejected. Hence, these claims satisfy the logic.
(a) The color of one’s skin has implications for moral worth.
(b) [insert bigoted premise that is pro-White and anti-Black . . .]
(c) White is a Good word, Black is a Bad word.
Point (a) is, I believe, obviously bogus. Point (b) is so stupid that I am not going to spend any time coming up with specifics. Yet, conclusion (c) does follow given (a) and (b).
So these subcategorizations are highly contextual, cover a very wide range of degrees and types of interest, and can themselves be good, bad, or evil in nature of their exploration.
Rising above this is the case for such a list that is objectively true and not requiring prior premises. This is not necessarily my list, but, again, I think I’m on the right track. As Michael Huemer puts it,
Intuitions are defined as initial, intellectual appearances. Ethical intuitions are intuitions with evaluative contents. They are not merely beliefs or products of beliefs. Not all intuitions are equally credible.
This post is not only a partial list. It is also just a partial argument—a mere introduction to moral knowledge much better argued by Huemer. That work is foundational to what I believe leading me to craft the partial list above and exploration throughout.
What about capitalist and socialist?
Why do I not allow the same for “capitalist” or “socialist”? I believe these are inherently Good/Bad, respectively. I don’t think they require prior premises. Once one fully understands what socialism entails—not just the practical reality from every example and why it doesn’t work in theory, but the essential nature that it is making obligations upon others that violate moral truths—one must conclude that it is a Bad.
Could one construct a subcategorization argument that elevates it logically? Sure, just like one can find a way to make “white” a Good word or “Black” a Bad word. This would amount to simply arguing that if we reject morality in favor of something else, we can reach a different outcome. Similarly, if you reject the laws of mathematics, you can make 2+2=5.
De gustibus non est disputandum